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C E N T R A L   I N T E L L I G E N C E   A G E N C Y

14 September 1951

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-29/2: PROBABILITY OF AN  
INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA PRIOR TO MID-1952

REFERENCE: NIE-29, 20 March 1951  
NIE-29/1, 4 May 1951

THE PROBLEM

To estimate the probability of an invasion of Yugoslavia  
prior to mid-1952.

SCOPE

This study should review the intelligence indications,  
positive and negative, since May 1951, of a possible Soviet/  
Satellite attack on Yugoslavia. In addition, the following  
three major factors should be re-examined to determine if  
they alter the conclusions of NIE-29 and 29/1: (a) the de-  
velopment of the Satellite forces; (b) the development of

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Yugoslav relations with the West; and (c) the internal stability of Yugoslavia.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

All  
Agencies

I. WHAT INDICATIONS, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE, OF A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA BY THE USSR AND/OR THE SATELLITES HAVE BEEN NOTED SINCE 1 MAY (date of NIE-29/1)?

II. WHAT CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN SOVIET/SATELLITE CAPABILITIES FOR AN ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA?

Defense

A. Are the Satellite military programs designed for aggressive purposes against Yugoslavia, and do the tempo and scale of those programs have a direct bearing on the possibility of an attack on Yugoslavia?

Defense

B. Are the Satellite forces now trained and equipped for action independent of Soviet forces, are they trained for coordinated action with each other, and has there been any change in their capabilities for an invasion of Yugoslavia?

Defense

C. Has there been any significant build-up of Soviet forces in countries adjacent to Yugoslavia?

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State

- D. Have there been any political and economic developments which affect Soviet/Satellite capabilities for an invasion of Yugoslavia?

State/  
Defense

III. WHAT CHANGES HAVE OCCURRED IN YUGOSLAV CAPABILITIES TO RESIST A SOVIET/SATELLITE ATTACK?

- A. Has Western economic and military assistance to Yugoslavia to date materially enhanced Yugoslav capabilities to resist a Soviet/Satellite attack?
- B. What effect will projected Western economic and military aid have on Yugoslav capabilities to resist?
- C. Do the Yugoslavs view their relations with the West, particularly the US, as sufficiently close as to constitute a guarantee of Western intervention in the event of an attack?

IV. IS THE TITO REGIME THREATENED BY INTERNAL INSTABILITY?

State

- A. Do current personnel shifts, purges, and charges of "Cominformism" within the Yugoslav Government and Communist party reflect any basic instability of the Tito regime?

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1. How far up do these actions extend in the governmental and party hierarchies?
2. To what extent are they related to Tito's efforts to improve relations with the West and to institute limited reforms within the government?
3. To what extent is the charge of "Cominformism" used to cover other charges such as inefficiency, graft, failures in Party discipline, etc?
4. Do these recent instances indicate increased effectiveness of Soviet/Satellite propaganda or subversive activities within Yugoslavia?

Defense

B. What is the degree of reliability of the armed forces?

State

C. How serious are Tito's internal difficulties which stem from local problems rather than those which stem from ideological differences?

1. How effectively has Tito controlled the national and religious rivalries of Yugoslavia and what are the prospects for effective control in the future?

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2. How serious is the peasant problem and what are the prospects for an effective solution?
3. Are there any effective non-Communist opposition groups within the country and, in view of the limitation on totalitarian methods which Tito's relations with the West will probably impose, are any such groups likely to develop?

State

- D. Are opposition elements within Yugoslavia, either pro-Cominform or non-Communist, likely to overthrow the Tito regime?
1. What aid is provided by USSR to pro-Cominform elements?

V. WHAT ARE PROBABLE SOVIET/SATELLITE INTENTIONS TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA?

State/  
Defense

- A. What is the probable Soviet estimate of the likelihood of the overthrow of the Tito regime by internal forces, whether pro-Cominform or non-Communist?

State/  
Defense

- B. What is the probable Soviet estimate of Satellite effectiveness in an attack on Yugoslavia?

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1. Could the armed forces of the adjacent Satellites alone defeat Yugoslavia?
2. Could the armed forces of all the Satellites defeat Yugoslavia?
3. If not, what degree of Soviet support and/or participation would be required?

State

- C. Would the Kremlin estimate that Yugoslav ties with the West are sufficiently close that an attack on Yugoslavia would probably result in Western intervention, thus greatly increasing the risk of general war?

All Agencies

- D. What is the likelihood of a Soviet/Satellite attack on Yugoslavia prior to mid-1952? Has the possibility increased or decreased since preparation of NIE-29 and 29/1?

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